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PAULA ABRAMS*

The Majority Will: A Case Study of
Misinformation, Manipulation, and the
Oregon Initiative Process
The moment a mere numerical superiority by either states or voters
in this country proceeds to ignore the needs and desires of the
minority, and for their own selfish purpose or advancement, hamper
or oppress that minority, or debar them in any way from equal
privileges and equal rights—that moment will mark the failure of
our constitutional system.
1

Franklin D. Roosevelt

At the dawn of the twentieth century, populists and progressives
forged a movement to reform American democracy. Fed up with
state governments corrupted by decades of control by big business
and big money, this movement sought to return sovereignty to the
people and make government, and the process of government, more
responsive to the needs of average citizens.
Populists and
progressives helped pass legislation, state and federal, protecting the
interests of laborers, farmers, and average citizens against corporate
2
dominance in both the economic and political sectors.
This
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Some passages in this Article
discussing Pierce v. Society of Sisters are drawn from PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES
(forthcoming 2009). I wish to thank the members of the Oregon Law Review and the other
participants in this symposium. I also want to thank Leslie Baze and Brienne Carpenter
for their outstanding assistance.
1 Radio broadcast, Mar. 2, 1930, in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 555
(Robert Andrews ed., 1993).
2 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XVI, XVII (limiting Congress’s ability to levy taxes
and providing for the popular election of U.S. Senators, respectively); Clayton Antitrust
Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52–53 (2008)) (strengthening the Sherman Antitrust Act and exempting unions from
antitrust legislation); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (1966) (establishing powers of initiative and
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movement also sought to bring government closer to the people,
urging voters to amend their state constitutions so that they could
govern directly through initiative or referendum. In 1898, South
Dakota became the first state to add direct democracy to its
constitution; Utah followed in 1900. Oregon was the third state to
adopt direct legislation but it was the first state to engage in direct
lawmaking. Oregon quickly became the prototype for the direct
democracy movement: the “Oregon System” was adopted around the
country. Today, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
3
include some form of direct democracy in their state constitutions.
Direct democracy was, and remains, highly controversial.
Criticisms of direct democracy are both normative and practical.
Most derive from the distinction between direct legislation and the
system of representation embodied in the U.S. Constitution and state
constitutions. Direct legislation eliminates the deliberative process of
legislative and executive review, circumventing the checks and
balances that define representative democracy. As a result, direct
democracy has been severely criticized for violating the Republican
Form of Government Clause of the U.S. Constitution, eliminating
political accountability, and failing to safeguard the rights of
4
minorities. The initiative process in states like Oregon comes under
referendum in California); CAL. PENAL CODE § 393 1/2 (West 1914) (prohibiting
employers from requiring more than an eight-hour work day); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18
(1908) (recall on public officials); 1908 Or. Laws c. 3 (limiting campaign expenditures);
1910 Or. Laws c. 5 (providing mechanisms for direct primary nomination).
3 Initiative and Referendum Institute, State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum
Provisions, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
Direct democracy comprises a variety of different methods for vesting lawmaking directly
with citizens, including popular initiative, referendum, and recall. Numerous variations on
these methods exist at both the state and local level. For purposes of this Article, direct
democracy and direct legislation refer to those forms of lawmaking that bypass legislative
and executive decision making and rest ultimate authority with the voters.
4 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 293, 295 (2007); K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using
Alternate Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1208
(1995); Edward J. Erler & Brian P. Janiskee, California’s Three Strikes Law: Symbol and
Substance, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 176 (2002); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1539 (1990); Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public
Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1995); Justin Henderson, The Tyranny of the Minority: Is it
Time to Jettison Ballot Initiatives in Arizona?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963, 964 (2007); David B.
Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 20 (1995); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And to the
Republic for Which it Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1061 (1996).
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particular fire because it allows amendment of the state constitution
5
by a simple majority vote.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, in designing a representative
system of government, weighed the virtues of a republic against those
of a plebiscite and rejected direct democracy. James Madison wrote
extensively on the dangers of direct democracy, warning of the dual
threats of a tyranny of the majority and the capture of government by
6
a minority faction. One hundred years later, when populists and
progressives campaigned to bring direct democracy to state
government, opponents sounded similar alarms, arguing that direct
legislation would lead to mob rule. More recently, critics charge that
a system designed to decrease the leverage of big business and big
money over government has become a powerful tool for well7
financed special interests.
Even if one assumes that majoritarian democracy is the ideal, direct
legislation typically is a highly flawed means of reflecting majority

5 OR. CONST. art. XVII; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (amended 2006) (requiring
that any proposed amendment or revision to the state constitution, whether proposed by
the legislature, by initiative, or by any other method, must be approved by at least sixty
percent of the voters rather than by a simple majority); Steve C. Briggs, Colorado Bar
Association President’s Message to Members—The Shadow Side of the Right to Vote: The
Ballot Initiative, 33 COLO. LAW. 47 (Nov. 2004); Catherine Engberg, Taking the
Initiative: May Congress Reform State Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican
Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2001); Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining
Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037
(2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself
of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the
Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1995).
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 61–62 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“[A]
pure [d]emocracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens,
who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the
mischiefs [sic] of faction. . . . [S]uch [d]emocracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been
violent in their deaths.”); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787),
in 24 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 500, 505–06 (Paul H. Smith
ed., Library of Congress 1996) (“Those who contend for a simple Democracy . . . assume
or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea,
that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but
that they have all precisely the same interests . . . . [N]o Society ever did or can consist of
so homogenous a mass of Citizens.”); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 253, 254 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1953) (stating that danger of oppression lies in acts where “Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents”).
7 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 4, at 1557–58; Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy:
Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1203–10 (2005).
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will. Poorly worded initiatives can leave voters confused about the
consequences of their vote. Citizens may ignore bloated voter
pamphlets and cast their vote with little or no substantive
understanding of the issues. Without the deliberative process,
unintended policy consequences occur. For example, Oregon
commercial fishing was halted when Oregon voters in 1908
simultaneously passed two competing initiatives banning or limiting
8
fishing methods in the Columbia River.
Unintended budgetary
impacts pose some of the most significant consequences of
circumventing the deliberation process. Implementation of initiatives
may require substantial state expenditures, often to the detriment of
other policies and programs.
One can readily conclude that lawmaking by initiative, the
manifestation of unchecked majority will, carries a high risk of
producing bad laws. The “bad law” risk posed by the initiative is not
simply that of generic poor policy. The absence of the deliberative
process can leave the voters with profoundly inaccurate information.
False information may be an unintended byproduct of the public
campaign, or it may be deliberately disseminated for political
advantage. Deliberate dissemination of false information can be a
particularly potent and harmful strategy to agitate the majority against
minority groups. Immune from legislative or executive review,
initiative campaigns may rely on appeals to voter prejudice. The only
checks on bias-driven initiatives are a well-financed opposition and
judicial review.
Direct democracy in Oregon has produced an abundant number of
controversial proposals. Since 1902, Oregonians have debated more
than 340 initiative measures, including proposals concerning recall of
public officials, popular election of U.S. Senators, women’s suffrage,
tax relief, supermajority voting requirements, the death penalty,
9
mandatory minimum sentences, gay rights, and death with dignity.
In 1922, Oregon voters approved one of the most controversial
initiatives in Oregon history, the compulsory public education
10
measure, dubbed the “School Bill” by the press.
The compulsory
8 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL: 1908–1910 (2008), available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/
elections11.htm.
9 See, e.g., infra note 33.
10 See, e.g., School Bill Makes Trouble for Democrats, OREGONIAN, Nov. 1, 1922, at 1;
School Bill Again Rapped, OR. STATESMAN, Nov. 1, 1922, at 2; Debate on School Bill,
OR. VOTER, Oct. 7, 1922, at 14.
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public education law, the first enacted in the country, required
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school,
effectively destroying private, particularly Catholic, education in the
state. The challenge to Oregon’s compulsory public education law
yielded a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Pierce v. Society of
11
Sisters. In Pierce, the Court struck down the Oregon law, finding
that it violated the constitutional rights of parents to control the
upbringing and education of their children.
The fight over compulsory public education revealed more than a
landmark constitutional dispute. The story of the School Bill
campaign offers insights into systemic problems with the initiative
process. The campaign was widely condemned throughout the
12
country for exploiting voter ignorance and prejudice. The initiative
inflamed passions on both sides, with political observers describing
the measure as the most controversial in the state since the question of
slavery. The proponents, led by the Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish
Rite Masons, waged a campaign that exploited voters’ antipathies
13
toward Catholics, radicals, and immigrants. Proponents also misled
the public as to the effect of the law. The success of these tactics
serves, even today, as a confirmation that direct legislation offers a
powerful vehicle for enacting prejudice against unpopular minorities.
During this commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Oregon
statehood, it is fitting to tell a story of how the constitution has
affected the lives of Oregonians. Through the initiative and
referendum process, average citizens wield substantial, and direct,
authority over state governance. As we assess the state constitutional
landscape, it is fair to conclude that direct legislation has dramatically
influenced Oregon law and history. The last thirty years have seen a
notable increase in the use of initiatives to resolve controversial social
issues. As we pause to reflect on Oregon’s rich constitutional history,

11

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See, e.g., Eyes of Nation Watching Forces of Intolerance in Struggle to Seize Oregon,
PORTLAND TELEGRAM, Oct. 26, 1922; RECORDER (San Francisco) (date unknown) (“Such
laws as the recently adopted Oregon School Law are a reflection upon the intelligence of
the people who adopted them, and . . . should be cast into the discard with other evidence
of bigotry and intolerance), as cited in NAT’L CATHOLIC WELFARE COUNCIL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW 8–9 (1923); NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov.
18, 1922 (“When we seek for the motives of the Oregon law we encounter the familiar
bogey of little minds . . . . A plague on all this intolerance masquerading as
Americanism.”), as cited in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW, supra, at 9.
13 See discussion infra Part III.B.
12
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it is wise to consider whether it is time to take a fresh look at judicial
review of direct legislation.
This Article presents a case study of the initiative process by
examining the campaigns waged for and against the School Bill. It is
not intended to provide a thorough study of deception and
discrimination in the initiative process. Instead, this Article offers
case-specific insight into how voters can be manipulated by
misinformation and prejudice. Part I examines the tension between
representative democracy and the initiative process, particularly how
the initiative undermines the deliberative process. Part II explores the
history of the Oregon initiative prior to the School Bill. Part III
describes how the Oregon initiative campaign for compulsory public
education used misinformation to confuse voters and encourage
bigotry. Part IV analyzes how voter ignorance, fear, and prejudice
toward minority groups may taint the initiative process. Part V
explores legal solutions and recommends that the courts reject the
presumption of constitutionality attached to facially neutral legislation
or legislation targeting nonsuspect classes and closely scrutinize
direct legislation that harms historically disadvantaged groups.
I
THE MAJORITARIAN DILEMMA
Ben Franklin, when questioned at the close of the Constitutional
Convention as to the type of government created, was famously
14
reputed to respond, “A republic, if you can keep it.” The Framers
embodied a republic in the structure of the U.S. Constitution by
limiting the unchecked power of majorities. Separation of federal
powers, division of power between federal and state governments, the
electoral college, and embedded checks and balances are the most
obvious examples that the Framers established a representative form
of government to prevent tyranny by diffusing power. It is no
accident that the people exercise no direct lawmaking authority under
the U.S. Constitution; the tyranny that concerned the Framers was as
15
much that of majority or “mob” rule as it was of a monarch.
14 As delegates emerged from the Constitutional Convention, the following exchange
purportedly took place: “Above the din, a Mrs. Powel, wife of the mayor of Philadelphia,
shouted out, ‘Well Dr. Franklin, what have we got, a monarchy or a republic?’ Franklin
looked at her over his spectacles and responded, ‘A Republic, madam, IF you can keep it.’
EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 11 (1972).
15 Alexander Hamilton, Convention of New York: Speech on the Compromises of the
Constitution (1788), in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 426, 440 (John C.
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Sovereignty may lie with the people, but only as a source of power,
not as lawmaker. Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
providing for election of senators by state legislatures, and Article V,
assigning the amendment process to Congress and state legislatures or
conventions, are powerful indicators of the Framers’ commitment to
16
limiting direct government.
Not surprisingly, The Federalist Papers laud the virtues of
17
representative democracy.
Madison argued that a republic offers
18
the best way to control the “dangerous vice” of faction. The harm
of faction derives from unchecked popular will:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.19

Hamilton ed., 1850) (“The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves
deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. [] Their very character was
tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an
ungovernable mob . . . . [I]t became a matter of contingency, whether the people subjected
themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant, or by another.”).
16 The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, replaced the process in Article I,
Section 3 with the election of senators directly by the people.
17 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62, 64, 65 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp.,
1995) (“A [r]epublic, by which I mean a [g]overnment in which the scheme of
representation takes place . . . promises the cure for which we are seeking. . . . [T]he
greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the
compass of [r]epublican, than of [d]emocratic [g]overnment . . . renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. . . . [T]he same advantage,
which a [r]epublic has over a [d]emocracy, in controlling the effects of faction, . . . is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does this advantage consist in the
substitution of [r]epresentatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render
them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied, that
the Representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the
event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree
does the [i]ncreased variety of parties, comprised within the Union, [i]ncrease this
security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the
extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at
194 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (asserting that the republican form of
government contemplated by the Guaranty Clause was predicated upon “the total
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity”) (emphasis in original); see also John
Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86–93 (Robert J. Taylor
ed.) (Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (“[T]here is no good government but what is
Republican.”).
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995).
19 Id. at 57.
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Madison made clear the value of a republic over pure democracy:
[A] pure [d]emocracy, by which I mean, a [s]ociety, consisting of a
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the
[g]overnment in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs [sic]
of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert
results from the form of [g]overnment itself; and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an
obnoxious individual. . . .
A [r]epublic, by which I mean a [g]overnment in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and
promises the cure for which we are seeking.20

Federalist 51 emphasizes the significance of republicanism to
protecting minority political groups:
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure.21

Other writings by Federalists strike similar themes. Alexander
Hamilton disdained the purported virtues of pure democracy:
It has been observed, that a pure democracy, if it were
practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has
proved, that no position in politics is more false than this. The
ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated,
never possessed one feature of good government. [] Their very
character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they
assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob
. . . .22

Charles Pinckney expressed similar misgivings about unfettered
democracy:
It is the anarchy, if I may use the term, or rather worse than
anarchy, of a pure democracy which I fear—where the laws lose
their respect, and the magistrates their authority; where no
permanent security is given to the property and privileges of the
citizens; and no measures pursued, but such as suit the temporary
interest and convenience of the prevailing parties, I cannot figure to
myself a government more truly degrading; and yet such has been

20
21
22

Id. at 61–62 (emphases added).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 169–70 (James Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995).
Hamilton, supra note 15, at 440.

ABRAMS

2008]

6/16/2009 10:55:43 AM

The Majority Will

109

the fate of all the ancient, and will, without great care, be probably
the fate of all the modern republics.23

Edward Rutledge wrote to John Jay about the need to mediate
populist government through separation of powers:
A pure Democracy may possibly do when patriotism is the ruling
Passion, but when a State abounds in Rascals (as is the case with
too many at this day) you must suppress a little of that Popular
Spirit, vest the executive powers of Government in an individual
that they may have Vigor, & let them be as ample . . . .24

And John Adams concluded that the “simplicity of . . . a pure
democracy will always have its charm with minds not kept awake to
25
its susceptibility of abuse.”
Even the anti-Federalists, far more supportive of pure democracy,
recognized the substantial difficulties faced by a federal government
designed as a national plebiscite. Some, like George Mason, argued
the virtues of pure democracy outweighed the risks: “I am for
preserving inviolably the democratic branch of the government. True,
we have found inconveniences from pure democracies; but if we
mean to preserve peace and real freedom, they must necessarily
26
become a component part of a national government.” The “Brutus”
essays admit that pure democracy functions only in political
communities small enough to make citizen participation practical and
meaningful:
In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is
declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come
together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot
be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it
must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds
as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate,
understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion
concerning it.27

23 Charles Pinckney, Speech to the New Jersey Assembly (Mar. 13, 1786), in 23
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 187, 192 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1976).
24 Letter from Edward Rutledge to John Jay (Nov. 24, 1776), in 5 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 538 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1979).
25 John Adams, Illness in Europe—Commercial Treaties—Mission to the Court of
Great Britain, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 400, 428 (1856).
26 George Mason, The Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787,
in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 383, 433 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937).
27 “BRUTUS” NO. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), The Anti-Federalist Papers, available at
http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus01.htm.
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Of course, the design of the federal government leaves unresolved
the legitimacy or value of pure democracy at the state level. The
Framers rejected a government based on national plebiscite. They did
not contemplate the variations on pure democracy presented by the
initiative and referendum. The Constitution does, however, address
the importance of representative government at the state level.
Article IV, Section 4 mandates that “the United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” The
debates at the Constitutional Convention on the Guarantee Clause
reflect a concern that individual states might institute a monarchy or
28
aristocracy. But many of the Framers were equally concerned about
29
The Constitution requires states, as
the tyranny of the majority.
well as the federal government, to establish a republic because the
Framers concluded that a representative democracy was superior to
any other form of government, be it monarchy or pure democracy.
The Guarantee Clause does not, however, define “a republican form
of government.”
Thus, the clause offers little guidance for
determining whether direct legislation satisfies the republicanism
30
requirement; a number of commentators have argued it does not.
28 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 280 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) (statement of
William Grayson) (“What, sir, is the present Constitution? A republican government
founded on the principles of monarchy . . . There is an executive fetter in some parts, and
as unlimited in others as a Roman dictator. A democratic branch marked with the strong
features of aristocracy, and an aristocratic branch with all the impurities and imperfections
of the British House of Commons . . .”); see also id. at 417 (statement of Francis Corbin)
(“Animadverting on Mr. Henry’s observations, that the French had been the instruments of
their own slavery, that the Germans had enslaved the Germans, and the Spaniards the
Spaniards, &c., he asked if those nations knew any thing [sic] of representation.”); 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
(statement of Edmund Randolph) (“[A] republican government must be the basis of our
national union; and no state in it ought to have it in their power to change its government
into a monarchy.”).
29 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 15; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 169 (James
Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“It is of great importance in a republic, not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society
against the injustice of the other part.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 124–25 (James
Madison) (Westvaco Corp., 1995) (“[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behaviour. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it;
otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of
their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans . . . .”).
30 See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 301–04; see also Steven William Marlowe, Direct
Democracy Is Not Republican Government, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1035, 1046–48
(2001); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The
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The Supreme Court has held the Guarantee Clause to be
31
nonjusticiable.
The robust republicanism of the original text of the U.S.
Constitution has, however, been tempered by numerous amendments
that enhance voter power and expand access to the franchise. The
amendments providing for direct election of senators, elimination of
the poll tax, and prohibitions on discrimination based on race, gender,
and age can be seen as a process of “democratizing” the
32
Constitution.
Direct legislation, in the form of the initiative and
referendum reflects a similar decision to infuse state representative
government with a strong dose of pure democracy. The U.S.
Constitution offers no clear answer on whether direct legislation’s
alteration of representative government fatally undermines
republicanism.
If the U.S. Constitution leaves unresolved the validity of direct
legislation, it does offer some compelling arguments for concern. The
initiative, designed to bypass the carefully wrought deliberative
process of legislative and executive review, removes powerful
systemic checks on prejudice in lawmaking. To begin with, the
initiative process circumvents the legislative drafting process. It
replaces professional analysis of legal conflicts and unintended
consequences with partisan citizen drafters who may decide that
confusion, rather than clarity, better serves their interests. More
significantly, lawmaking by initiative eliminates the benefits of
deliberation gained through legislative debate and compromise.
Direct legislation also removes the check of executive review through
signature or veto. Finally, unlike elected officials, voters have no
duty to support the U.S. and state constitutions and remain
unaccountable for acting on prejudice rather than reasoned judgment.
These departures from representative government are substantial and
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19–24 (1993); Engberg, supra note
5, at 575–76; Rogers & Faigman, supra note 4, at 1058–59.
31 See, e.g., Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 147–51 (1912); see also
discussion infra Part II.B. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 4; Gavin M. Rose, Note,
Taking the Initiative: Political Parties, Primary Elections, and the Constitutional
Guarantee of Republican Governance, 81 IND. L.J. 753, 780 (2006); Glen Staszewski,
Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2003); Ethan J. Leib, Redeeming the Welshed
Guarantee: A Scheme for Achieving Justiciability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 143 (2002);
William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism and the Guarantee Clause, 2 GREEN
BAG 2D 269, 271 (1999). Most of the commentators who claim that direct democracy
violates the Guarantee Clause also argue that the Court should find the clause justiciable.
32 U.S. CONST. amends. XVI, XVII, XIX.
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significant. In particular, the omission of the checks and balances
embodied in the deliberative process seriously undermines the
protection of minority group interests, a value at the core of our
constitutional system.
In Oregon, the success of the 1922 initiative requiring all children
to attend public schools offers a compelling example of how the
initiative may be used as a tool of prejudice against minority political
groups. The Oregon campaign in favor of compulsory public
education revealed the dark side of the initiative process. Populists
and progressives believed direct democracy would expand the rights
and interests of citizens by returning lawmaking to the people. With
the School Bill, the people of Oregon faced the decision whether to
use the initiative to reduce, rather than expand, the rights of her
33
citizens. The choice they made was driven by fear and bigotry. It
would not have been made without the initiative.
II
THE STORY OF THE OREGON SYSTEM
The populist and progressive drive to give average citizens greater
control over lawmaking garnered enthusiastic support in many states,
but perhaps nowhere more so than in Oregon, which enacted a direct
democracy system that became a model for other states. The direct
democracy movement generated a great deal of controversy within
the state, but when Oregonians finally approved direct legislation they
wielded the initiative and referendum with zeal. Since 1902, the
initiative process has been a powerful tool for transforming Oregon
social policy.
A. Populists and Progressive Roots
The Oregon direct democracy movement began in the late
nineteenth century, when a poor economy and unsafe working
conditions in mines and timber attracted many Oregonians to
populism. They flocked to the People’s Party and placed populist
politicians in the statehouse. In 1887, Oregon became the first state to
34
recognize the first Monday in September as Labor Day. Populists
achieved only limited legislative success however; the legislature also

33

See discussion infra Part III.B.
PHILIP SHELDON FONER, MAY DAY: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS’ HOLIDAY, 1886–1986, at 4 (1986).
34
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housed incompetence and corruption, the “briefless lawyers, farmless
farmers, business failures, bar-room loafers, Fourth-of-July orators,
35
[and] political thugs” who served as the “representatives of the
36
monied and monopolistic classes.” It was the corporate officers,
bankers, and railroad magnates—the “First Families of Portland”—
who controlled the legislature.
Rampant corruption in the management of federal land grants and
the political power of corporate special interests pushed Oregonians
to a radical response. During the 1890s, an alliance of labor and farm
interests joined to form the Joint Committee on Direct Legislation, a
populist organization committed to bringing direct democracy to
37
Oregon.
Their literature promised that direct democracy, through
the referendum and initiative process, would “make it impossible for
corporations and boodlers to obtain unjust measures by which to
38
profit at the expense of the people.” The Joint Committee, and its
successor, the Direct Legislation League, joined with the populist
People’s Party in an aggressive campaign to lobby support for a
constitutional amendment establishing an initiative and referendum
system. The secretary of each of these groups, William S. U’Ren, a
populist, attorney, and political activist, became the primary architect
of direct democracy in Oregon, and a prominent figure in the national
direct legislation movement where he became known as the “father”
39
of the Oregon System.
U’Ren and the Populists faced an uphill battle in a Republican
dominated state. Editorials in the Oregonian called the proposal “one
40
of the craziest of all the crazy fads of populism,” a “vagary which
41
Undeterred, U’Ren sought a larger political
nobody cares about.”
forum to build support for the initiative and referendum amendment.
Elected to the Oregon House of Representatives in 1897 as a Populist,
35 David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William
Simon U’Ren and “The Oregon System,” 67 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 949 (1994) (quoting
ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN
OREGON (1912)).
36 ROBERT D. JOHNSTON, THE RADICAL MIDDLE CLASS: POPULIST DEMOCRACY AND
THE QUESTION OF CAPITALISM IN PROGRESSIVE ERA PORTLAND, OREGON 122 (2003).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Oregon Historical Society, U’Ren Defends Communist Labor Party Members,
http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/historical_records/dspDocument.cfm?doc_ID
=D345218C-AF45-DB28-82EA18F907B554D8 (last visited June 2, 2009).
40 Editorial, Main Aspect of Our Contest, OREGONIAN, May 9, 1894, at 4.
41 Editorial, The Populist Platform, OREGONIAN, Mar. 17, 1894, at 4.

ABRAMS

114

6/16/2009 10:55:43 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, N

U’Ren orchestrated the infamous “Hold-up Session” of the 1897
legislature, exploiting infighting between factions of Republicans to
42
prevent formation of a quorum in the House. After two months, the
legislature went home without convening, but U’Ren came away with
promises of support for the direct legislation amendment from a
number of powerful Republicans. U’Ren called in those Republican
pledges to gain legislative approval of the proposal during the 1899
and 1901 legislative sessions. By the time the amendment went to the
voters in 1902, direct legislation enjoyed the support of all the
political parties in Oregon, except the Prohibitionists.
The
amendment passed in a landslide, 62,024 to 5668, amending the state
43
constitution for the first time since 1859.
Direct democracy, dismissed only a few years earlier as a
44
“socialistic innovation,” became the rallying cry of a citizenry fed
up with public and corporate corruption. Prominent Oregon politician
George Williams accurately captured the public’s mood when he
concluded that “in these days, when corporations and combinations of
corporations have become so powerful, it seems to us that this
amendment is necessary to protect the people from the aggressions of
45
the money power of the country.”
The “Oregon System,” as the
reforms became known around the country, provided the majority
with a potent antidote to the special interests controlling the
statehouse.
B. Opposition
The vision of egalitarian, participatory democracy promised by
direct legislation did not appeal to all Oregonians. Business interests
and conservatives feared an empowered, radical majority, enamored
of populist platforms and fomenting political chaos. Philosophical
opposition came from those who considered direct democracy at odds
with the representative form of government established in the U.S.
42 Robert C. Woodward, William S. U’Ren: A Progressive Era Personality, in
EXPERIENCES IN A PROMISED LAND 195, 197 (G. Thomas Edwards & Carlos A.
Schwantes eds., 1986).
43 Oregon State Archives, Oregon Constitutional Amendments: 1902–1910,
http:/arcweb.sos.state.or.us/exhibits/1857/learn/am/amend1.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 establishes the initiative and referendum. Article IV, section 1(1)
provides: “The legislative power of the state, except for the initiative and referendum
powers reserved to the people, is vested in a Legislative Assembly . . . .”
44 Editorial, supra note 40.
45 JOHNSTON, supra note 36, at 123.
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Constitution.
Some populists and progressives viewed direct
democracy as simply another means for the wealthy and powerful to
deceive the average citizen into passing laws against their interests:
How would you like to live in a state where the people can and
do amend their constitution in the most radical fashion by a
minority vote, where one-third of the voters decides the fate of laws
affecting the other two-thirds, . . . where special interests hire
citizens to circulate petitions asking for the recall of judges who
have found them guilty; where men representing themselves as for
the people, buy signatures with drinks, forge dead men’s names,
practice blackmail by buying and selling, for so much per name,
signatures for petitions needed to refer certain measures to the
people; a state where the demagogue thrives and the energetic crank
with money through the Initiative and the Referendum, can legislate
to his heart’s content . . . ?46

One prominent Oregonian, Ralph Duniway, son of suffragist
Abigail Scott Duniway, went further, stating: “[I]f the initiative and
referendum is in force, I predict that men will be shot in the streets of
Portland, that a state of anarchy will exist in Oregon, and that it will
47
be necessary to call out the Federal troops.”
The Oregon System survived legal challenges at both the state and
federal level. In Kadderly v. City of Portland, the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected a claim that the amendment violated Article IV,
Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees to each state “[a]
48
republican form of government.” The court found that in the direct
democracy system “[t]he representative character of the government
still remains. The people have simply reserved to themselves a larger
share of legislative power, but they have not overthrown the
republican form of the government, or substituted another in its
49
place.”
When the Article IV Guarantee Clause challenge to the Oregon
initiative came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. In Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the Court held that the constitutional
authority to determine whether a state has a republican form of
government resides with Congress, not the courts. Thus, the Court
46 ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN
OREGON v–vi (1912).
47 Editorial, Predicts Dire Disaster: Ralph R. Duniway Scores Initiative and
Referendum, OREGONIAN, Dec. 12, 1904, at 8.
48 Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903).
49 44 Or. at 145, 74 P. at 719–20.
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reasoned that the constitutional challenge to direct legislation
50
presented a political question outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
Pacific States sounded the death knell for challenges to direct
legislation through the Guarantee Clause.
C. Direct Democracy During the Progressive Era
The strength of public support for the Oregon System, and the
vigor with which U’Ren and his People’s Power League employed
the initiative and referendum, produced a veritable revolution in state
government within a few short years. In 1904, Oregonians, by
initiative, approved a direct primary law that included, well before the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, a provision for the direct
election of U.S. Senators. In rapid succession the citizens adopted an
array of progressive legislation including protective labor laws, recall
power on public officials, a corrupt practices act, authorization for a
state university, taxes on oil, railroad, utility, and communication
companies, and extension of the initiative and referendum process to
51
local government. By 1914, Oregonians added women’s suffrage,
abolition of the poll tax and the death penalty, proportional
representation, and the requirement of indictment by grand jury to the
list of reforms achieved through the initiative process. Although
nearly half of the states eventually adopted some form of the Oregon
System, during the first decade of the twentieth century Oregon stood
alone in aggressively employing it, putting twenty-three initiatives on
the ballot.
The Oregon initiative, as used in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, served the progressive era well. Direct legislation
increased citizen involvement in the political process and reduced the
influence of special interests. Many of the reforms, including
women’s suffrage, recall power, and workers’ compensation,
expanded the rights and political participation of less powerful
52
groups.
U’Ren also achieved success in assuaging conservative
business interests that the system provided “ample insurance against
53
any revolutionary laws.”
During these early years of direct

50

Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 129 (1912).
EATON, supra note 46, at 50–52.
52 See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. II, § 18 (1906) (recall of public officials); OR. CONST. art.
IX, § 1a (1910) (abolishing poll tax); 1912 Or. Laws c.1 (mandating eight-hour maximum
work day for contractors and laborers employed by state or municipal government).
53 JOHNSTON, supra note 36, at 124.
51
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legislation, Senator Jonathan Bourne described the Oregon system as
“the best system of popular government in the world today” and “the
54
safest and most conservative plan of government ever invented.”
But Oregonians’ attachment to direct legislation carried a clear risk
of abuse. Allen Eaton, scholar and Oregon legislator, wrote in his
1912 book The Oregon System: “From what has been said, it already
must appear that the people of the state of Oregon enjoy a very wide
political power—so wide that they may do anything in politics that
55
they please to do.”
The direct democracy experiment drew national attention to
Oregon. U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice and former President,
William Taft, reflected popular opinion when, visiting the Northwest,
he described Oregon as a useful “laboratory” for dangerous political
and social experiments, too remote from the centers of population in
56
the Union to pose a serious hazard to the rest of the country.
Taft’s view of Oregon as a venue for political experimentation
proved accurate. In 1922, when proponents of the School Bill
initiative obtained sufficient signatures to place the measure on the
ballot, Oregonians faced a “dangerous” decision on whether to use the
power of the initiative to reduce the rights of the Catholic and
Lutheran minorities who maintained private schools.
III
THE STORY OF THE SCHOOL BILL INITIATIVE
The School Bill was sponsored by a small group of Scottish Rite
Masons. However, the political weight behind the measure came
primarily from the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan swept into Oregon in
1921 and, in little more than a year, became the most powerful
political force in the state. The School Bill was born from post-World
War I nationalist fervor. Immigrants, including Catholics and
German Lutherans, were mistrusted and perceived as unpatriotic, as
was anyone seen to be sympathetic to Bolshevism or socialism. The
arrests of more than 7000 suspected radicals during the Red Scare of
1919-20 were the most dramatic indicator of the nationalism
sweeping the country. Mandatory public education was touted as a
powerful tool to assimilate immigrants and indoctrinate all children in
54

EATON, supra note 46, at v; JOHNSTON, supra note 36, at 124.
EATON, supra note 46, at 6.
56 LAWRENCE J. SAALFELD, FORCES OF PREJUDICE IN OREGON, 1920–1925, at 63
(University of Portland Press 1984) (1950).
55
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American values. The Oregon initiative process allowed a powerful
minority faction to put before the voters a proposal born primarily of
fear and hatred. It gave the homogenous, Protestant majority the
power, and the opportunity, to determine the fate of private education.
The sponsors of the School Bill gambled that the majority could be
persuaded to ignore the interests of the minority religious groups who
maintained private schools. An editorial in The Portland Telegram
described the attitudes of many favoring the School Bill: “We, the
majority, have decided what is necessary . . . . The public schools
please us. Why not make them please the other fellow? Why not
march him up to the school of our choice and say to him in effect:
57
‘There, take that, it’s good for you.’”
School Bill proponents were not content to rest their campaign on
simple appeals to majority politics. The face of their campaign
advocated the imperatives of assimilation and nationalism. But they
also waged a more nefarious campaign, using misinformation and fear
to exploit voters’ prejudice toward minority groups.
The contentious School Bill campaign foreshadowed the persistent
problems that plague the initiative process and give serious concern
about the harm posed by exploiting voter ignorance and prejudice. As
with many controversial initiatives that emerged in later years and
decades, the campaign was marked by voter confusion about the
initiative and blatant appeals to distrust of minorities. In 1922,
Catholics, immigrants, and political radicals were the targeted groups.
Today, while the identities of the groups may differ, the tactic of
demonizing unpopular minorities often mirrors the hate-filled
58
campaign of 1922.
A. Deception in the Ballot
The sponsors of the School Bill called their initiative the
“Compulsory Education Bill,” a title liable to confuse voters who
thought they were voting to assure the continuation of mandatory
attendance requirements. Oregon already had compulsory education;
compulsory attendance laws were enacted in 1889, requiring children
between the ages of nine and fifteen to attend school.
57

Editorial, He that Soweth Sparingly, PORTLAND TELEGRAM, Oct. 26, 1922.
See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 7, at 1209–13; Linde, supra note 30, at 35–40; Eule,
supra note 4, at 1553–56; William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of Opinion?
The Problems Caused By the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449 (1998).
58
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Complaints that the sponsors intended to mislead voters with the
ballot title dated from the signature-gathering phase. The Portland
Spectator reported that sponsors secured signatures by assuring
citizens that the purpose of the initiative was “to give every child an
59
education.”
The pamphlet released by the Catholic Civic Rights
Association against the School Bill argued, “[t]his bill secured a place
on the official ballot by fraud, misrepresentation, and
60
misunderstanding of many of those who signed the petitions . . . .”
Interviews with petition signers suggested that perhaps thousands
signed under the belief that the measure was merely a compulsory
school attendance proposal.
Proponents exploited the misconception about the purpose of the
School Bill throughout the campaign. They urged citizens to vote
61
“yes” for “Compulsory Education.”
This misnomer gave School
Bill advocates the strategic advantage of charging their opponents
with harming Oregon’s children by being “anti-compulsory
education.” The opponents tried to alert voters to the real purpose of
the initiative, calling it the “so-called Compulsory Education Bill.” In
addition to reaping the benefits of any confusion generated by the
ballot title, School Bill supporters successfully used the ballot title as
a campaign slogan. The ballot title made it easy for supporters to
distill the campaign to a simple proposition, “Are you for the public
schools or against them?”
Despite widespread efforts to prevent voters from being misled by
the ballot title, School Bill opponents believed that many voters went
to the polls and voted for what they thought was “compulsory
education.” In a pamphlet printed after the election entitled
Remember Oregon, Dudley Wooten, Executive Secretary of the
Oregon Catholic Civic Rights Association, wrote that: “[a] potent
influence in the election, as it was cunningly contrived it should be,
62
was the false and misleading title given to the bill.” The effect of
this deceptive name misled thousands of voters, and created such

59

PORTLAND SPECTATOR, Oct. 14, 1922.
DUDLEY G. WOOTEN, 24 REASONS AGAINST LAWS TO ABOLISH PRIVATE SCHOOLS
AND TO CREATE STATE MONOPOLY OF SCHOOLS 3 (1923).
61 Ads ran in newspapers throughout the state asking voters to “honor” public education
and support “Free Public Schools.” See, e.g., Advertisement, OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1922,
at 2; Advertisement, EUGENE DAILY GUARD, Nov. 1, 1922, at 6. The ads consistently
referred to the School Bill as “The Compulsory Education Bill.” See, e.g., Advertisement,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1922, at 2.
62 DUDLEY G. WOOTEN, REMEMBER OREGON 7 (1923).
60
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confusion in the minds of thousands of others that they refrained from
voting at all. Wooten acknowledged the advantage the ballot title
may have given its sponsors: “it served to put the opponents of the
measure in a false light before the general public, by making it appear
that they were warring against compulsory education in the free
63
public schools.”
B. Appeals to Prejudice
Appeals to prejudice may be a far more potent campaign tactic than
exploiting voter confusion. The proponents of the School Bill
recognized that the overwhelmingly Protestant, white voters in
Oregon had little experience with diversity. Catholics and immigrants
made convenient scapegoats for the substantial problems of postwar
America.
The risk that the Bolshevik Revolution would be
successfully exported to America created a profound national unease,
particularly in states where economic turmoil prevailed. In Oregon,
the profitable shipbuilding industry collapsed after the war, creating
massive unemployment and labor unrest. School Bill proponents
played on Oregonians’ political fears and economic anxieties by
assuring voters that compulsory public education promised an
egalitarian process of assimilation that would bring stability to the
64
country and guarantee a new generation of patriotic Americans.
The compulsory public schooling movement tapped into deep
suspicions about Catholics. Some proponents, led by the Ku Klux
Klan (“Klan”) leaders, wanted to be certain that Oregonians perceived
Catholics as unpatriotic and beholden to a foreign power in Rome.
The Scottish Rite Masons’ aggressive support of compulsory public
education contained mixed messages, combining appeals to patriotism
and anti-elitism with blatant bigotry. The Oregon Masons published a
number of ads rife with anti-Catholic messages. One typical ad
charged that opponents of the School Bill include “[t]hose who
believe the rights of church should take precedence over the rights of
65
the state.”
The Klan also directly provoked hostility toward
Catholics, as in this statement by Exalted Cyclops Fred Gifford: “We

63

Id.
The voter pamphlet argument in favor of the School Bill urged: “[m]ix the children of
the foreign-born with the native-born, and the rich with the poor. Mix those with
prejudices in the public school melting pot . . . and finally bring out the finished product—
a true American.” OREGON SCHOOL CASES, COMPLETE RECORD 732–33 (1925).
65 OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1922.
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do feel that as the allegiance of Catholics is to a foreign power, the
pope, that their clannish attempts to extend the temporal power of the
pope over the offices of this country is opposed to the best interests of
66
America . . . .”
To Klan audiences, Gifford spoke even more bluntly, throwing
them the raw meat of bigotry he claimed they craved: “Somehow
these mongrel hordes must be Americanized; failing that, deportation
67
is the only remedy [in the] best interests of America.” Other Klan
leaders aggressively attacked Catholics. The Reverend Reuben H.
Sawyer, Klan leader and pastor of Portland’s East Side Christian
Church, was one notorious example. His garbled message sounded a
veritable potpourri of religious bigotry, nativism, and patriotism:
The Ku Klux Klan swears allegiance to the flag and not to the
church. . . .
One of our purposes is to try to get the Bible back into the
schools, such as it was in the old days. The little red schoolhouse
on the hill is the cornerstone and foundation for our government.
Within the next few years we hope to see only native born
Americans rule the government instead of foreigners.68

While the anti-Catholic strategy preyed on Protestant fears that
Catholics answered only to Rome, it also fostered antipathy toward
Catholic schools. Proponents urged voters to protect the public
schools from the “Roman monopoly” and the “catechized
69
monstrosities [that] would destroy all of our public schools.”
Masonic supporters of the initiative, proclaiming the “truth” as to the
official position of Masonry on the public schools, boasted that all
Masons pledge to protect the public schools from the “assults [sic] of
those who would destroy and create in its stead a system of parochial
schools, supported by public taxation, dominated and controlled by
and under the absolute influence and power of an autocratic
hierarchy, upon ideas foreign in conception and directly contrary to
70
the theory of . . . American democracy.”
Allegations of substandard education and incompetent teaching in
private schools surfaced, intermingled with insinuations about the
appropriateness of the curriculum, particularly in parochial schools.
66
67
68
69
70

OREGON VOTER, Mar. 25, 1922.
Id.
KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE KU KLUX KLAN IN THE CITY, 1915–1930, at 205 (1967).
J.E. Hosmer, Advertisement, SILVERTON APPEAL, Oct. 13, 1922, at 2.
J.J. Pittenger, Advertisement, ASTORIA BUDGET, Oct. 21, 1922, at 4.
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The disseminators of these innuendos never offered evidence to
support their claims. On the surface, these criticisms purportedly
were directed at the adequacy of citizenship instruction in religious
schools. But the criticisms also played on Protestants’ lack of
familiarity with Catholic schools. Sometimes implied, sometimes
explicit, these charges all made the same point: Catholics could not be
trusted to teach American patriotism because they were committed to
instructing loyalty to Rome over loyalty to country.
The anti-Catholic campaign exploited Protestant Oregonians’
ignorance of the Catholic religion by portraying the Catholic Church
as a secretive cult, beholden to suspicious and immoral practices. Dr.
James R. Johnson, Portland Klan leader, traveled Oregon making
inflammatory speeches that accused Catholic priests of misusing the
confessional to obtain sexually stimulating disclosures. Johnson and
other Klan members paraded a series of disgruntled ex-nuns and
priests before audiences eager to hear scandalous tales of sexual and
physical abuse within the Catholic cloister. Ex-nun Elizabeth
Schoffen, the most infamous mouthpiece for the Oregon Klan,
denounced the church before packed auditoriums. Schoffen served
for many years as a floor supervisor at St. Vincent’s Hospital in
Portland, but she left her Order and turned on the church after she was
transferred to a less prestigious assignment. Speaking as “Sister
Lucretia” and drawing on her purported thirty-one years of experience
as a nun, she spread sordid accusations about depraved behavior at St.
Vincent’s. At one of her more seamy speeches—one restricted to
“men only”—a man representing more than fifty physicians attempted
to distribute flyers protesting her attacks against St. Vincent’s. He
was beaten until unconscious and dumped outside of town. The
Sisters of St. Vincent responded with a public refutation of Sister
Lucretia’s charges. They also requested Portland Mayor George
Baker launch a public inquiry to prevent further damage to the
71
hospital’s reputation, an invitation that Baker refused. In response,
a group of fifty-eight non-Catholic physicians paid for a full-page
advertisement protesting the vilification of the Sisters through crude
72
and malicious falsehoods.
These attacks on Catholics took on new relevance to many
Oregonians upset about the explosive political issue of public school
teachers wearing religious garb in school. Approximately twenty
71
72

SAALFELD, supra note 56, at 24–25.
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nuns worked in public schools throughout Oregon, both as teachers
and principals. These nuns wore the habits of their religious orders
during the school day. The Klan lost no time in circulating campaign
ads built around pictures of public school classes posing with their
teacher in religious garb. The ads simply instructed voters “Find the
73
Teachers—then THINK!” Other ads identified the nuns teaching in
public schools and their respective salaries, and then quoted part of a
statement by Theodore Roosevelt, who opposed “any appropriation of
74
public money for sectarian purposes.”
The juxtaposition of these
pictures with the charge that Catholics sought to control the public
schools provided powerful propaganda for School Bill proponents.
One of the first acts taken by the Klan-dominated 1923 legislature
was the enactment of a law banning public teachers from wearing
religious garb in the classroom.
The Oregon Klan’s pamphlet on the School Bill, The Old Cedar
School, exemplified Klan strategy toward working class Oregonians.
Part populism, part religious bigotry, The Old Cedar School managed
both to excoriate multiple minority religions for their elitist efforts to
destroy public education and to deny any religious animus. Replete
with longing for a more homogeneous era, the pamphlet offered a
dialogue between an unsophisticated farmer and his troublesome
children, who married Catholics, Episcopalians, Methodists, and
Seventh-Day Adventists. The children intended to reject the Old
Cedar School, a fictitious public school, in favor of private religious
schools. In the Forward, King Kleagle Luther Powell wove populist
and progressive themes, claiming that the School Bill campaign
represents a “battle of the mass of humanity against sects, classes,
combinations and rings; against entrenched privilege and secret
machinations of the favored few to control the less favored many,”
and that those who opposed the initiative “wished to work their
75
children and collect their earnings.” According to Powell, the Klan
supported the School Bill because the group had a duty to protect
public schools from the onslaught of private religious education, not
76
because it desired the “destruction or injury of any religious sect.”

73 Campaign flyer, Lutheran Schools Committee, Compulsory Education Bill in
Oregon, 1922–1925, MSS 646, Oregon Historical Society Research Library.
74 ASTORIA BUDGET, Oct. 2, 1922.
75 GEORGE ESTES, THE OLD CEDAR SCHOOL 5 (1922).
76 Id. at 6.
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The Old Cedar School ridiculed its opponents, mocking a fictional
intellectual windbag named the Hon. Ab. Squealright, and Catholic
education at the “Academy of St. Gregory’s Holy Toe Nail,” where
children learn “Histomorphology, the Petrine Supremacy,
77
Transubstantion . . . [and] the Beatification of Saint Caviar.” Nor
did it equivocate on charging minority religions with a conspiracy to
destroy the public schools. A full-page cartoon at the end of the
pamphlet depicts the Old Cedar School, with its loyal, old teacher in
the doorway welcoming children of all backgrounds and religions
while the American flag waves atop the bell tower. But holding the
children back are the Catholic, Episcopalian, Methodist, and SeventhDay Adventist mothers. As a Catholic priest approaches the school
with a burning torch, an Episcopalian bishop, a Seventh-Day
Adventist minister, and a Methodist superintendent swing against the
foundation of the school with large mallets. The last image, also a
full page, shows the school in flames, toppling from its foundation
with the old schoolteacher dead in the doorway, his hand futilely
grasping the cord of the burning school bell as the American flag,
severed from the school tower, ignites. The Catholic priest walks
78
away, his torch extinguished, a smile on his face.
In the pamphlet, as elsewhere in the Klan campaign, the Klan
hurled accusations of religious persecution back at their opponents,
charging them with manufacturing claims about religious bigotry to
79
protect their elitist institutions.
Klan leaders ridiculed all nonProtestant religions, mocking “Mohammedans,” polygamists, and
“head-hunters,” who “howled” religious persecution whenever the
80
enlightened majority intervened to halt their brutal practices.
As the campaign progressed, the anti-Catholic assault became more
public and personal. The Klan attempted to undermine its opponents
by accusing Protestant adversaries of being Catholic, or part of the
Catholic “machine.”
The most prominent victim of this
misinformation campaign was Governor Ben Olcott. Governor Olcott
faced rumors that were spread throughout the state that he and his
wife were Catholic and sent their children to Catholic school, and that
his deceased sister, a Methodist Sunday school teacher before her
death, was still alive and living as a nun in San Francisco. False
77
78
79
80

Id. at 26.
Id. at 38, 44.
Id. at 7–8.
Id.
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statistics about the number of Catholics appointed to government
positions by Olcott circulated as evidence of Olcott’s obeisance to the
Catholic machine.
Many of the newspapers in the state failed to challenge the
campaign of prejudice waged throughout the state. Some supported
the Klan; others feared its wrath. Newspaper editors opposed to the
Klan or the School Bill fell prey to deceitful charges. The Klan
regularly assailed adverse editorials as the work of Catholics. In an
editorial entitled “Liars and Us,” The Bend Bulletin alleged that
“[e]ver since we began our argument against the Ku Klux Klan . . .
reports have been coming to us of a story going about to the effect
that the editor . . . was a Catholic” and that the Bulletin “‘is controlled
by the Catholics,’ and people have been asked to boycott us on that
81
account.”
Hugh Hume, the editor of the weekly, The Spectator,
82
faced similar false accusations. The public status of the recipients
of these attacks put them in the awkward position of denying the
allegations while at the same time trying to assure voters that they
would be proud to be Catholic and were only protesting the
“unconscionable” lying of their attackers.
Misinformation was also spread about the propensity of parochial
school graduates to engage in criminal behavior. Distortions of
Catholic scripture also surfaced. Anti-Catholic speakers ranted that
“the law of the Church says drink all you can,” a dramatic
misinterpretation of Christ’s counsel to his disciples at the Last
83
Supper to “drink ye all of this.”
C. The Catholic Response
As in any political campaign grounded in bigotry, School Bill
opponents faced significant political risks if they aggressively
denounced the religious bigotry in the School Bill campaign.
Moderate voters perhaps could be persuaded that the School Bill
threatened religious liberty. These arguments could easily backfire if
voters perceived them as charges of religious prejudice. School Bill
opponents often found themselves on the defensive when they
attempted to debate the impact of the measure on religious liberty.
81

Editorial, Liars and Us, BEND BULLETIN, Oct. 20, 1922, at 4.
SAALFELD, supra note 56, at 53.
83 Stenographic record of lecture in Lebanon, Oregon, Catholic Truth Society Archives,
as quoted in The Case of the Sisters of the Holy Names vs. The State of Oregon, Sisters of
the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary Research Library.
82
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Catholics, acutely sensitive to the potential backlash, devised a
strategy that championed the importance of religious liberty and
tolerance to all Americans and downplayed religiously divisive
attacks. It was a weak and generic response to the bigotry inflamed
by the Klan. Opponents of the initiative staked their campaign on
convincing voters that compulsory public education violated the
rights of parents to control the education of their children, an
argument that ultimately persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court, but
failed to sway Oregonians. When the votes were counted, the School
Bill passed by a margin of 11,821 votes, 115,506 to 103,685,
84
garnering 52.7% of the vote.
Interestingly, 22,066 voters showed
up at the polls but abstained from voting on the School Bill; thus the
85
abstainers were almost double the margin of victory. Whether those
voters abstained from confusion or apathy is a matter of conjecture, as
is the intent of the voters who approved the measure. Some voters
certainly voted for the School Bill because they decided that
compulsory public schooling offered an anti-elitist, egalitarian
education in democracy. But others just as certainly channeled their
prejudices and fears into a “Yes” vote.
The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
the largest provider of private education in the state, joined with the
secular Hill Military Academy to challenge the law in federal court.
In 1924, the federal district court in Oregon found the School Bill
unconstitutional, concluding that it violated the economic rights of
86
schools, teachers, and parents. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court
rendered its decision in 1925, the political influence of the Klan in
Oregon had dissipated. The Court’s holding that the School Bill
violated the constitutional rights of parents to control the upbringing
and education of their children relieved most Oregonians, many of
whom were uncomfortable with the scorn directed at Oregon for its
passage of an initiative perceived nationally as the product of bigotry.

84

OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM
RECALL: 1922–1928, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/
elections14.htm (last visited June 3, 2009).
85 OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, BLUE BOOK AND OFFICIAL DIRECTORY, 1923–
1924, at 170 (1923).
86 Soc’y of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928 (D. Or. 1924).
AND
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IV
VOTER CONFUSION AND BIAS IN THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
The voter confusion and appeals to prejudice that marked the
initiative campaign for compulsory public education are not unique to
that controversy. To the contrary, they are emblematic of persistent
concerns with the use of the initiative to determine social policy.
Initiative states tend to use direct democracy to enact conservative
social legislation, including the death penalty, restrictive abortion
87
laws, and anti-gay rights measures.
Voter ignorance or confusion
about ballot measures often leads voters to abstain from voting on
88
those ballot items.
One analysis of the first thirty years of the
Oregon initiative showed, on average, a twenty-seven percent voter
“drop off”—voters who show up at the polls but fail to vote on one or
89
more ballot measures.
The reasons for the low voter response to direct legislation during
that period are not documented. Voter confusion may explain some
voter behavior, as well as apathy. More recent data offers insight on
voters who pull the lever for candidates but not ballot measures.
Surveys show a wide range of voters express concerns that ballot
90
measures are too complicated to understand.
In Oregon, twenty
87 See John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 195
(2005).
88 A 1985 survey of California voters found sixty-eight percent said they would not vote
on a ballot measure if they were not knowledgeable on the issue. Eule, supra note 4, at
1518 n.54. In a 2005 voter survey in California, when asked to name the ballot measure
that interested them the most, voters’ top response was “don’t know” (thirty-eight percent)
or “none” (twelve percent). Press Release, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., Special Survey on
Californians and the Initiative Process (Sept. 2005), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
survey/S_905MBS.pdf. Of voters polled in the 2005 survey, seventy-seven percent found
ballot initiatives “complicated and confusing.” Id. at vi. On voter confusion, see also
Rose, supra note 31; Magleby, supra note 4, at 23; PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY,
IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 121–22 (1992).
89 Waldo Schumacher, Thirty Years of the People’s Rule in Oregon: An Analysis, 47
POL. SCI. Q. 242, 245 (1932).
90 Eule, supra note 4, at 1516 n.46 and accompanying text (“A recent poll of voters
revealed that only fifteen percent of those surveyed felt that they consistently knew enough
about initiative measures to make a wise decision. Another 37% claimed to know enough
about the issues involved to make a wise decision on ballot measures ‘most’ of the time.
The remaining 47% admitted to confusion on a regular basis. Similar voter perceptions
were detected in an earlier mail survey of four western states. Thus, 41% of Arizona
voters surveyed ‘strongly agreed’ that initiative and referendum measures on the ballot
were ‘so complicated that one can't understand what is going on’ with 33% agreeing
‘somewhat.’ In Colorado, 23% strongly agreed and 36% agreed somewhat. In Oregon,
the figures were 20% and 40% and in Washington, 18% and 34%.” (citation omitted)).
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percent of voters “strongly agreed” that ballot measures were too
complicated to understand; forty percent of voters agreed
91
Oregon, like a number of other direct legislation
“somewhat.”
92
states, limits an initiative to “one subject only.”
Oregon also
requires that any “two or more amendments” be “separately”
93
These provisions offer some protection
submitted on the ballot.
against voter confusion by prohibiting logrolling of proposals but they
do little to address voter confusion occurring from complex or poorly
worded ballot titles or text.
Voter confusion presents particular concerns when the rights of
minorities are on the ballot. Confused voters frequently vote counter
94
to the policies they intend to support.
The risk that substantive
policy will be made based on an inaccurate reflection of voter will is
especially problematic when individual rights are at stake. The
School Bill campaign demonstrated that voter confusion can be a
powerful partner to prejudice, leading to the enactment of laws
harmful to minority interests. The School Bill campaign also
revealed that fomenting voter confusion is often a tactical component
of a campaign strategy that seeks to obscure the issues.
Voter confusion is not a problem specific to direct democracy.
Voter ignorance and confusion exist on matters of candidate choice,
not just ballot measures. But a misinformed vote for or against a
candidate typically poses less risk of harm than voter error in the
enactment of substantive policy. The deliberative process embodied
in representative government is designed, through checks and
balances, to prevent abuse by an individual—both in the accumulation
of power and in the perpetuation of hostile legislation. These
91

Id.
See OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(d); see also CAL. CONST. art. II, § 18; OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 15(d); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 57; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 27.
93 OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
94 See Eule, supra note 4, at 1518 (“Studies of voting on propositions generally reveal a
significant percentage of voters casting ballots at variance with their stated policy
preferences. Estimates of this number generally run from ten to fifteen percent, although
occasionally the figures rise much higher. . . . In a 1980 plebiscite on a local rent control
ordinance those desiring to retain rent control were required to vote against the measure.
Over three-fourths of the voters questioned in exit surveys did not match up their views on
rent control with their votes on the measure. One quarter favoring rent control incorrectly
voted yes while one half opposing it erroneously cast a negative vote.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984) (fifteen percent of voters on a 1979 Ohio
referendum voted at variance with their stated position; sixty percent who voted on 1969
California lottery proposition marked ballot capriciously).
92
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protections limit the potential for mischief from any one elected
official.
Voter abstention on initiatives is particularly problematic. Where
abstention is high, lawmaking by initiative, unlike legislation, may
result in the enactment of substantial social change based on the will
of less than a majority of voters. During the first thirty years of direct
legislation in Oregon, more than sixty-eight percent of the ballot
measures were either adopted or rejected by a minority of registered
95
voters.
The 11,000-plus margin of voter approval on the School
Bill was half of the 22,000 voters who went to the polls but abstained
96
from casting their opinion on compulsory public education. These
statistics highlight the risks of interest group capture—that a highly
motivated faction will use the initiative process to make social policy
with the support of less than a majority of the electorate. Voter
confusion and abstention tend to favor interest group capture by
reducing ballot measure voters to special interest voters. The threat of
interest group capture is particularly problematic when the rights of
minority political groups are put to a vote. Special interest groups
fronting initiatives often are ideologically driven factions, mobilized
after failing to convince the legislature to act on their proposals.
The vulnerability of minority groups to discrimination through
direct legislation is a direct consequence of majoritarian governance.
The majority often has little incentive to protect minority interests and
every incentive to further its own interests. A recent analysis of direct
legislation addressing gay rights, English language laws, AIDS
policy, school desegregation, and housing and public
accommodations for racial minorities found “strong evidence” that
97
minority groups suffer from direct legislation. Of the seventy-four
civil rights initiatives examined, more than ninety-two percent
98
“actively sought” to limit minority rights.
An extension of this
analysis concluded that, faithful to Madison’s concern, minority rights
99
are most vulnerable in smaller, homogeneous political communities.
The School Bill was the first successful Oregon initiative targeting
an unpopular minority, but it has hardly been the last. Although the
95

Schumacher, supra note 89, at 249.
Id. at 252.
97 Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245,
245–46 (1997).
98 Id. at 254.
99 Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An
Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1023 (1998).
96
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use of direct legislation in Oregon subsided for a number of decades,
the late 1970s saw a resurgence in measures impacting minority
groups, including reinstatement of the death penalty, mandatory
100
minimum sentence requirements, and crime victims’ protection.
The most blatant recent targeting of a minority group through direct
legislation has been a series of initiative proposals limiting rights of
101
homosexuals.
Although voters have not approved all of these
measures, the overt targeting of gay and lesbians reinforces concerns
about the use of direct legislation as a tool of discrimination. This
criticism does not suggest that legislatures are immune from
approving discriminatory legislation. One need look no further than
the Jim Crow laws for evidence that representative government also
can fail to protect unpopular minorities. But more typically,
representative government and the deliberative process function
effectively to reject discriminatory proposals. In representative
government, judicial review serves as the last level of scrutiny in a
system designed to constrain the excesses of the majority. By
contrast, judicial review provides the only substantive check on the
enactment of discriminatory laws through direct legislation.
V
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Although there is a persuasive argument that direct legislation is a
departure from representative government, the U.S. Supreme Court
has shown little inclination to revisit its 1912 holding that the issue is
102
nonjusticiable.
The Court should reconsider its decision in Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. The opinion relied upon an 1849
decision, Luther v. Borden, in which the Court refused to decide
which of two dueling government factions should be deemed the
lawful government of Rhode Island, concluding that the issue
presented a nonjusticiable political question under the Guarantee
103
Clause.
The Court in Pacific States should not have equated the
100 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.005–163.145 (amended 1978 and 1984); id. ch. 136 and §
40.385 (amended 1986), ch. 137 (amended 1988).
101 See, e.g., Minority Status and Child Protection Act, Oregon Ballot Measure 13
(1994) (denying minority status to homosexuals).
102 A number of commentators have urged the Supreme Court to reexamine its 1912
holding in Pacific States. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 304; Marci A.
Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1,
13–14 (1997).
103 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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dispute in Luther with the challenge to the Oregon initiative process.
The challenge to lawmaking by initiative presented a different, and
far narrower question; it attacked the form, not the existence of
republican government. Unlike Luther, where the Court was asked to
identify the legitimate government of the state, Pacific States
involved a challenge to the method of lawmaking in an established
government. Luther represents the paradigmatic “political” question.
The Court in Baker v. Carr agreed, noting that Luther’s only
significance is its holding that “the Guaranty Clause is not a
repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could
utilize independently in order to identify a State’s lawful
104
government.”
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority, opened the door to some reconsideration of
the Guarantee Clause: “More recently, the Court has suggested that
perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present
105
nonjusticiable political questions.”
Even if the Court is willing to
revisit the broader question of the justiciability of the Guarantee
Clause, it has given no indication that it would be inclined to entertain
a challenge to the constitutionality of direct legislation. To the extent
that judicial review remains the only meaningful check on direct
democracy, courts should carefully scrutinize laws and amendments
enacted by direct legislation that undermine one of the core values
underlying representative democracy—the protection of minorities
from majority tyranny.
A. State Judicial Review
The Oregon Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Armatta v.
Kitzhaber shows an increased willingness by the court to scrutinize
106
direct legislation.
In Armatta, the court struck down Ballot
Measure 40, a crime victims’ rights initiative, because the measure
violated an Oregon constitutional requirement that any “two or more
amendments” to the Oregon Constitution must be voted upon
107
Armatta marks the first time the court substantively
separately.
addressed the separate vote requirement. Since then, the court has
struck down a number of other initiatives under the Armatta rule;
these opinions represent the most successful attacks on the initiative
104
105
106
107

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992).
327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998).
OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
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108

in Oregon history.
Although the Armatta test does not assess the
substantive legitimacy of ballot measures, it nonetheless offers a
potent judicial check on direct legislation, particularly of measures
that may be the product of voter confusion from multiple subjects.
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde has argued
persuasively that state courts should scrutinize direct legislation under
109
the Guarantee Clause.
State courts have tended to read Pacific
States as a broad preclusion of judicial review under the Guarantee
110
Clause.
If, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court suggests in New
York, Pacific States does not preclude judicial review of all issues
under the Guarantee Clause, state courts should begin to ascertain
whether, and under what circumstances, the initiative may undermine
111
a republican form of government.
The 1903 Kadderly decision,
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Pacific States, does not bar
further consideration of whether aspects of direct legislation may
violate the Guarantee Clause. Kadderly simply held that direct
legislation is not inherently inconsistent with a republican form of
government; it does not stand for the conclusion that all uses of direct
112
legislation are consistent with the Guarantee Clause.
State courts
should begin to address what challenges to direct legislation may be
subject to judicial review under the Guarantee Clause.
B. Federal Judicial Review
Federal judicial review offers an important check on state laws and
constitutional amendments enacted through direct legislation. The
late professor Julian Eule, in a thorough analysis of direct legislation,
advocated a “hard look” by courts faced with constitutional
113
challenges to lawmaking by plebiscite.
Eule argued that the
normal presumption of constitutionality that attaches to judicial
review of most legislation should not apply when a court is reviewing
direct legislation. In the absence of the filters so essential to
representative democracy, it falls to the courts to assure that the

108 Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 231, 37 P.3d 989 (2002); Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or.
597, 43 P.3d 1094 (2002); League of Or. Cities v. State, 334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892 (2002).
109 See, e.g., Linde, supra note 30; Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican
Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994).
110 See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996).
111 See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223 (Kan. 1973).
112 Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 145, 74 P. 710, 720 (1903).
113 Eule, supra note 4, at 1558.
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values of representative government have not been disrupted by direct
114
While I agree with Eule’s assessment, my proposal is
legislation.
narrower, focusing on the risk of harm to minority groups presented
by direct legislation: the courts should dispense with any presumption
of constitutionality when reviewing direct legislation that harms a
historically disadvantaged minority group. Close scrutiny of direct
legislation compensates for the absence of the deliberative process
and provides a necessary check on animus-based initiatives. Close
scrutiny should occur even where the law is facially neutral and even
if the disadvantaged group is not otherwise entitled to heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. I offer this proposal for
several reasons. First, discrimination against minorities is the most
significant harm posed by the initiative process. Further, the focus on
harm to minority groups is consistent with the Framers’ concerns
about direct democracy. Finally, existing equal protection doctrine
easily could accommodate enhanced scrutiny of direct legislation that
harms unpopular minorities.
Current equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the courts to impose strict scrutiny on classifications based
115
on suspect criteria such as race, national origin, or religion.
Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy are considered quasi116
suspect and receive intermediate scrutiny.
Heightened scrutiny
generally protects suspect and quasi-suspect classes from
discriminatory lawmaking where the classification is obvious on the
117
face of the legislation.
Facially neutral classifications that are
alleged to disadvantage suspect or quasi-suspect groups are subject to
heightened scrutiny only if the classification has a disparate impact on
the minority group and evidence of discriminatory purpose is
118
established.
Classifications not based on suspect or quasi-suspect
criteria are presumed constitutional unless they fail to satisfy a
119
rationality test.
The presumption of constitutionality typically
insulates legislation impacting nonsuspect classes or classifications
that are not apparent on the face of the law.

114

Id. at 1558–59.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
116 Under intermediate scrutiny, the classification must be substantially related to an
important government interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
117 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
118 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1981).
115
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The presumption of constitutionality is based, in part, on the
assurance of checks and balances in lawmaking undertaken through
the deliberative process. The famous Carolene Products footnote
describes certain types of legislation where the presumption of
constitutionality should not apply, including “legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,” and situations where
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
120
minorities.”
Although the footnote addresses only legislation, the
principles, resting upon a concern for situations where the political
process may malfunction to negate normal checks and balances, are
equally applicable to lawmaking by plebiscite. Direct legislation
targeting minorities should be subject to heightened scrutiny
precisely because it circumvents the checks and balances designed to
protect minority interests.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans offers
support for careful scrutiny when reviewing direct legislation
disadvantaging minority groups. In Romer, the Court invalidated a
Colorado constitutional amendment enacted by referendum that
repealed state and local laws protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination and prohibited the enactment of new laws protecting
121
gays and lesbians.
Classifications based on sexual orientation
122
Although the Court did not
typically receive rational basis review.
indicate any special standard would apply to review of direct
legislation, it did examine the legislation with a scrutiny
uncharacteristic of rational basis review. The Court struck down the
123
referendum because it concluded that it was the product of animus.
As the Court explained, legislation motivated by animus is per se a
violation of equal protection: “[I]f the constitutional conception of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
120

Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (emphasis added).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
122 The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the standard of review for
classifications based on sexual orientation. Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals to rule on
the issue have held that rational basis is the appropriate standard of review. See, e.g.,
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989).
123 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
121
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cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”
The Court
has invalidated other direct legislation when it found that the purpose
125
The Court’s
of the law was to disadvantage minority groups.
analyses in these cases reflect a certain suspicion, not only about the
purpose behind these measures, but also more generally about the
ability of the direct legislation process to correct for discrimination.
Unfortunately Romer obscures the issue by purporting to apply
traditional rational basis review; the Court should articulate a standard
of heightened review of direct legislation to ensure that animus will
not go undetected.
Equal protection doctrine is heavily dependent upon purpose-based
inquiry. The text and impact of direct legislation is as easily analyzed
as lawmaking by representative bodies. While direct legislation does
not provide the traditional legislative record to evaluate purpose, it
offers ballot measure statements and campaign materials that serve a
similar function. As with analysis of legislative lawmaking, the issue
is not the individual motivations of the sponsors and voters, but rather
the purpose of the law. Deceptive ballot titles and voter information,
with resulting voter confusion, may be highly relevant to evidence of
discriminatory purpose.
The most tenable way for the U.S. Supreme Court to proceed in
reviewing direct legislation is to find challenges to direct legislation
justiciable under the Guarantee Clause and address whether direct
legislation undermines the core principles of representative
democracy. Even without reconsideration of the Guarantee Clause,
the Court should reject the presumption of constitutionality attached
to facially neutral legislation or legislation targeting nonsuspect
classes when reviewing direct legislation disadvantaging minority
groups. Heightened scrutiny is justified as a check on a form of
lawmaking that bypasses the carefully wrought constitutional
framework of legislative and executive decision making.
The Oregon Supreme Court has embarked on a late, but welcomed,
scrutiny of direct legislation. The Oregon Constitution’s separate
vote and single subject limitations provide the potential for a
meaningful check on the risk of majoritarian abuses of the minority.

124

Id. (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking
down a facially neutral law prohibiting mandatory busing for desegregation of the
schools); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (limiting the authority of government to
adopt fair housing laws).
125
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Judicial review, with teeth, at both state and federal levels, offers the
best protection of the principles of representative democracy.
CONCLUSION
The Oregon System of direct legislation gained national
recognition as the prototype for popular governance. The use of the
initiative to pass the School Bill gained Oregon a different kind of
notoriety: the School Bill campaign was widely condemned for
exploiting voter confusion and prejudice to achieve passage of a
measure that discriminated against unpopular minorities. The
troubling legacy of this campaign remains a force in Oregon and other
states that employ direct legislation to limit individual rights. As we
contemplate both the past and the future of the Oregon Constitution, it
is appropriate to reconsider deferential judicial review of direct
legislation. Direct legislation, a departure from a representative form
of government, should be subject to rigorous scrutiny by state and
federal courts to assure that this variance does not undermine the core
values of representative democracy.

